We present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy...

It is well-known that Gaussian hedging strategies are robust in the sense that they always lead to a cost process of bounded variation and that a superhedge is possible if upper bounds on the volatility of the relevant processes are available, cf. El Karoui, Jeanblanc-Picque and Shreve (1998)...

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the...

In this paper we show that deposit insurance can increase the probability of systemic banking crisis, even though it is optimally designed and its premium is risk related. This is driven by the possibility of contagious bank runs. We prove that contagion only occurs if the correlation between...

The Benefit and Cost of Winner Picking: Redistribution Vs Incentives

We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the owner possesses private information about the buyers' valuations of the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism design model. In an...

In this paper, the effects of so-called model misspecification and the effects of dropping the assumption that continuous rebalancing is possible are examined. Strategies which are robust if applied continuously fail to be robust if applied in discrete time. Therefore, the hedging bias which...

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6...