Showing 71 - 80 of 100,106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011818580
The purpose of the paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212139
We consider the impact of fairness and moral hazard in a principal-agent bargaining model, where the agent can affect the size of the surplus by his actions. Our main results are as follows; a) the offer predicted by the basic fairness model (excluding moral hazard) results in inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105233
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not explicitly incentivized. This paper offers an explanation for this observation based on the assumption that agents are envious and suffer utility losses if others receive higher wages. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058880
We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any perfect-Bayesian equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074819
In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028813
One of the main advantages of delegation is that specific department level information is used. Its main disadvantage is probably that central management looses direct control over certain actions. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted trade-off. We show that delegation might be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014168047
Is the second best outcome of static agency models renegotiation proof? In models with one period of renegotiation, Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) answer no when the principal makes the offer, while Ma (1994) and Matthews (1995) answer yes when the agent makes the offer. This paper analyzes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014085601
decentralized team contracts, as well. We prove that the principal may restrict attention to team contracts whenever returns from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643114