This paper investigates the relation between a firm's location and its corporate finance decisions. We develop a simple model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to make acquisitions, and to facilitate those acquisitions, firms within clusters maintain more...

This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. We provide conditions under which human capital is more efficiently created and better utilized within industrial clusters that contain...

The paper presents a theory of optimal transparency when financial institutions are exposed to rollover risk. Transparency enhances the stability of the financial system during crises but has destabilizing effects in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency...

We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank-specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency...

This paper provides a theory of informal communication (cheap talk) between firms and the capital market. The theory emphasizes the central role that agency conflicts play in firms' disclosure policies. Since managers' information is a consequence of their actions, incentive compensation and...

Capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm, as well as on headquarters' assessment of the divisions. While corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions, the external assessment of the firm is a public good for...