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Group contest success function : the heterogeneous individuals case

Osório, António - In: International game theory review 20 (2018) 4, pp. 1-8

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016593

Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Savva, Foivos - In: Journal of mathematical economics 78 (2018), pp. 27-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105449

Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 118 (2016) 4, pp. 816-840

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665595

Immunity to credible deviations from the truth

Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590472

Partially-honest Nash implementation : a full characterization

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2017

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011755972