In an asset market with explicit trading rules we characterize the trading activity of an ambiguity-averse insider who faces Knightian uncertain over other market participants' beliefs and implements a robust trading strategy. Such insider employs a max-min choice mechanism, so that in any round...

We consider the impact of pessimism on monetary policy within a model with backward looking expectations and persistence in the dynamics of output and inflation. We show that pessimistic monetary authorities move their instruments to hedge against the worst economic shocks. With respect to their...

We analyse how capital controls affect FX microstructure, using as a case study the introduction and subsequent removal of controls in Iceland. We use a VAR of private order flow, Central Bank order flow and EURISK that allows for contemporaneous feedback effects to analyse the impact and...

We propose a general framework for the analysis of dynamic optimization with risk-averse agents, extending Whittle's (Whittle, 1990) formulation of risk-sensitive optimal control problems to accommodate time-discounting. We show how, within a Markovian set-up, optimal risk-averse behavior is...

Using a standard monetary policy model, we study how foreign exchange intervention may be used to condition the perception among economic agents of the objective of the policymaker. Foreign exchange intervention does not bring about a systematic policy again, such as an increase in the...

We discuss how Whittle's (Whittle, 1990) approach to risk-sensitive optimal control problems can be applied in economics and finance. We show how his analysis of the class of Linear Exponential Quadratic Gaussian problems can be extended to accommodate time-discounting, while preserving its...

We study a generalization of Kyle's (1985) model to the case in which the specialist is risk-averse and does not set the transaction price according to semi-strong form efficiency. We see that Kyle's call auction market is no longer a robust market structure, as linear Bayesian equilibria do not...