This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price...

This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price...

It is common for firms to systematically share financial and productivity data with their input suppliers, as well as their rivals. However, there has been a systematic change in the US policy towards vertical relationships in the past decades: both FTC inaction and courts rulings have curtailed...

This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile networks in the presence of call externalities and network effects. It argues that the regulation of mobile termination rates based on fully allocated costs, or “long-run incremental cost plus”, exacerbates the network...