This paper develops a game-theoretic model of petty corruption by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic...

We model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries, their actions at each date produceemissions of greenhouse gases, and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases. The theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise....

The 'Savage paradigm' of rational decision-making under uncertainty has become the dominant model of human behavior in mainstream economics and game theory. However, under the rubric of 'bounded-rationality', this model has been criticized as inadequate from both normative and descriptive...

We model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries, their actions at each date produce emissions of greenhouse gases, and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases. The theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise....