Tools for recreational resources management are topics of great theoretical and practical interest. The most commonly used tool undoubtedly is the licence or permit. The implementation of a system of licences to regulate the use of a natural resource is far from simple as it presupposes the...

We incorporate a renewable resource into an overlapping generations model without capital and with quasi-linear preferences. Besides being an input for production the resource serves as a store of value. We characterise the dynamics, efficiency and stability of the steady state equilibria. The...

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offers abatement cost savings under the Kyoto Protocol by allowing credits for emission reductions obtained in signatory developing countries. The paper shows that it is necessary to include technology transfers in the CDM to obtain correct incentives for...

In this paper we consider Voluntary Agreements (VAs) as an information-sharing device. In a duopoly model firms compete à la Cournot and aim to reduce environmental damages because consumers have green preferences that partially internalise negative externalities. However both firms are...

We develop a multiple-firm model of an industry's voluntary adoption of environmental protection measures to achieve a predetermined industry-wide emissions reduction target under an explicit threat of imposition of an emissions tax. We examine the free-riding incentive of individual firms and...

We consider a setting where firms undertake emission-reducing R&D and the regulator, who sets the emission tax, is unable to commit credibly. Firms are subject to research spillovers in emission reduction. We examine two regimes with respect to the organization of R&D: independent R&D and an...

Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like EPA's Project XL allow plants to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for command-and-control regulations that dictate pollution abatement strategies. TR can significantly reduce participants'...

I model environmental overcompliance as a signalling device. In the model, a benevolent government may or may not tighten environmental standards. Production costs under the stricter environmental regulation are private information to the firms, and tightening environmental policy is socially...

An increasingly popular instrument for solving environmental problems is the "public voluntary agreement (VA)", in which government offers modest technical assistance and positive publicity to firms that reach certain environmental goals. Prior papers treat such agreements as a superior,...

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various oligopoly parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main...