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Renegotiation Facilitates Contractual Incompleteness
Wernerfelt, Birger - 2006
Attempts to economize on bargaining costs imply that two parties may write a contract which is incomplete in the sense …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026493
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Relational contracting, repeated negotiations, and hold-up : conference paper
Kranz, Sebastian - 2013
relational contracts are repeatedly newly negotiated during relationships. Negotiations take place with positive probability and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336791
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Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian - In: Games and economic behavior 80 (2013), pp. 157-178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763934
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Relational contracting, repeated negotiations, and hold-up
Kranz, Sebastian - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706860
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A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
Miller, David A.; Watson, Joel - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 81 (2013) 6, pp. 2303-2350
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237409
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Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up
Kranz, Sebastian - 2013
relational contracts are repeatedly newly negotiated during relationships. Negotiations take place with positive probability and … money can be transferred. This paper formulates a theory of relational contracting in dynamic games. A crucial feature is … that existing relational contracts can depreciate and ensuing negotiations then treat previous informal agreements as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087220
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Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
Watson, Joel - In: Annual review of economics 13 (2021), pp. 631-659
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012612595
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Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512
I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
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Contract, renegotiation, and holdup : an optimal contract when interim renegotiation is possible
Göller, Daniel - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 175 (2019) 4, pp. 736-764
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168524
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Under/over-investment and early renegotiation in public-private partnerships
Danau, Daniel; Vinella, Annalisa - 2019
We consider a public-private partnership in an infrastructure project, which requires specialised expertise during the construction stage for the infrastructure to operationalise. This entails that, after an investment is made to begin building the infrastructure, its construction is completed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119945