Showing 86,241 - 86,250 of 88,562
To gain insights about the quality of board's firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand- collected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390666
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager’s employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422137
UK executives' stock option exercises and associated sell decisions are motivated by private, inside, information. Executives use their inside information to lock in short-term gains, and to sell stock acquired prior to negative abnormal stock returns. This informed trading is robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322777
The behavior of a hedge-fund manager naturally depends on her compensation scheme, her preferences, and constraints on her risk-taking. We propose a numerical method which can be used to analyze the impact of these influences. The model leads to several interesting and novel results concerning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323933
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324959
brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions … return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325712
convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways … altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their employees … than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325842
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325988
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326054
We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely tobe dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, controlling for various other factors, unlikelyto be directly associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326426