After the first section, introducing some typical problems of family capitalism, the following three sections of the paper consider the ambiguity of the legal framework defining the modern corporation, the two way relation between technology and property rights and the different mechanisms by...

Is the division of labor under capitalism because of transaction and technological efficiency or because of inefficient capitalist property rights? The answer of this paper is that under "classical" capitalism there is an inefficient division of labor because of underinvestment in asset-specific...

In this paper, we show how in Gellner we can find a stimulating analysis of the institutional equilibria that characterise agrarian and industrial society and the conditions that make possible institutional change from one equilibrium to another. This allows a convincing account of the reasons...

The paper first considers a number of theoretical aspects surrounding the ambiguity of the legal framework defining the modern corporation and the two-way relation between technology and property rights. It then looks at the evolution of corporate governance through time, paying particular...