When a contract is signed between two economic agents, it is likely to produce some effect on non-contracting, third parties and provide new information to the contracting parties. This thesis examines how such third party externality and newly generated information should affect the initial...

Scholars have cataloged rigidities in contract design. Some have observed that boilerplate provisions are remarkably resistant to change, even in the face of shocks such as adverse judicial interpretations. Empirical studies of debt contracts and collateral, in contrast, suggest that covenant...

A potentially dangerous product is supplied by a competitive market. The likelihood of a product-related accident depends on the unobservable precautions taken by the manufacturer and on the type of the consumer. Contracts include the price to be paid by the consumer ex ante and stipulated...

In mergers and acquisitions transactions, a buyer and a seller will often agree to contractual mechanisms (deal protection devices) to deter third parties from jumping the deal and to compensate a disappointed buyer. This paper analyzes various deal protection devices, with a focus on two most...