When actions by one agent force another to deviate from their agreements with a third, “victim” turns into “injurer” in the chain’s subsequent steps. Should the chain’s initiator be responsible only for the direct harm they cause or also bear some of the indirect losses they trigger?...

We investigate the recent fee mechanism EIP1559 of the Ethereum network. Whereas previous studies have focused on myopic miners, we here focus on strategic miners in the sense of miners being able to reason k-blocks ahead. We derive expressions for optimal miner behavior (in terms of setting...

This paper considers allocation rules. First, we demonstrate that costs allocated by the Aumann-Shapley and the Friedman-Moulin cost allocation rules are easy to determine in practice using convex envelopment of registered cost data and parametric programming. Second, from the linear programming...

This paper considers allocation rules. First, we demonstrate that costs allocated by the Aumann-Shapley and the Friedman-Moulin cost allocation rules are easy to determine in practice using convex envelopment of registered cost data and parametric programming. Second, from the linear programming...

This paper considers allocation rules. First, we demonstrate that costs allocated by the Aumann-Shapley and the Friedman-Moulin cost allocation rules are easy to determine in practice using convex envelopment of registered cost data and parametric programming. Second, from the linear programming...

This article investigates progressive development of Aumann-Shapley cost allocation in a multilevel organizational or production structure. In particular, we study a linear parametric programming setup utilizing the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition procedure. Typically cost allocation takes place...