The paper analyzes the profitability of RDcooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that a firm prefers RDcompetition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers RDcartelization to RJV cartelization when...

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share...

A patent challenger who defeats a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors. This forced sharing undercuts an alleged infringer's incentive to stay in the fight to the finish - especially if the patent owner offers an attractive settlement. Too many...

The decision to cooperate within R&D joint ventures is often based on `expert advice.' Such advice typically originates in a due diligence process, which assesses the R&D joint venture's profitability, for example, by appraising the achievability of synergies. We show that if the experts who...

This paper reviews the theoretical literature concerning the welfare effects of Research Joint Ventures. The analysis pays attention on both the most debated questions and the topics not yet covered in the literature. The study suggests the existence of two main streams: one positive, the other...

Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility...