This model explicitly incorporates thedynamic aspects of conservation programs withincomplete compliance and it allows landholders’behaviour to change over time. We find that incompleteand instrument-specific enforcement can have asignificant impact on the choice between subsidyschemes and...

In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental policy instruments in a general equilibrium framework. Goulder et al. (J.Pub.Econ., 1999) look into the choice of policy instruments in the presence of distortionary taxes. We extend this model by no...

This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behavior to change over time. A distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can...

This article applies an alternative approach to the measurement of scholarly quality, namely the use of TOP-curves, in order to rank journals in the field of environmental and resource economics. This measure summarizes the incidence, intensity, and inequality of these journals' highly cited...