We examine the effect of insider share pledges on corporate fraud. We find a positive, causal relation between share pledges by controlling shareholders and detected corporate fraud. Firms whose controlling shareholders pledge have longer fraud detection cycles and receive lighter punishments....

We analyze class action litigation as a corporate governance device. Firms that have lower internal governance standards and those with fewer external monitors are more likely to be indicted. Lawsuits announcements are salient information to the market, as firms, on average, lose 12.3% without a...

This article explores price impact in the context of securities fraud litigation, focusing on the probability of observing directionally-consistent abnormal returns (those that go in the direction of a plaintiff's theory of liability) under the hypothesis of price impact versus no price impact....

In this article, I use a unique dataset consisting of listed Indian firms that have been indicted for economic malpractice/default or have been non-compliant with laws/ regulations/ guidelines to estimate the stock price impact of regulatory actions against corporate irregularities. The sample...