We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors’ average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …