We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model, the sender can communicate...

It is well-known that subjects can exhibit a preference for increasing payments. Smith (2009a) makes a related prediction that the difference between the preference increasing wage payments and the preference for increasing non-wage payments will be largest for intermediate payments. We find...

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects...

We identify a largely efficient market in which there is a relationship between race and market outcomes. Examining data on NBA games, we find that teams with more black players tend to face larger point spreads and that these teams perform worse against the spread. These biased outcomes are...

This paper presents evidence which challenges the view that techniques which are designed to measure the social preferences of subjects can always be accomplished in a nonintrusive manner. We find evidence that such measurements can influence the preferences which they are designed to measure....