This paper studies mutual consent social networks in which individuals imperfectly monitor others' network ties and have incomplete information about the benefits of network participation. I introduce the Conjectural Pairwise Stability concept, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996)...

In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. In such environments we show that, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely...

The goal of this paper is to study how informational frictions affect asset liquidity in OTC markets in a laboratory setting. The experiments replicate an OTC market similar to the one used in monetary and financial economics (Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2005):...

We examine two factors that help explain the prevalence of conflict in low-income countries: that adversaries cannot enforce long-term contracts in arms, and that open conflict alters the future strategic positions of the adversaries differently than does peace. Using an infinite horizon model,...

We examine the game theoretic properties of a model of crime first introduced by Short, Brantingham, and D'Orsogna (Short et al. 2010) as the SBD Adversarial Game. We identify the rationalizable strategies and one-shot equilibria under mul- tiple equilibrium refinements. We further show that...

Many social and economic networks emerge among actors that only partially observe the network when forming network ties. We ask: what types of network architectures form when actors have limited observation, and does limited observation lead to less efficient structures? We report numerous...