Showing 81 - 90 of 329
Why do legal disputes ever go to trial? Prior research emphasizes the role of mistakes, irrationalities, or asymmetric information because rational litigants with complete or symmetric information should choose pre-trial settlements over the costs and risks of trial. Using a dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959987
We examine the optimal disruption of dark (covert and illegal) networks. Of central importance is that an interventionist will generally have incomplete information about the dark network's architecture. We derive the optimal disruption strategy in a stylized model of dark network intervention...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959990
We examine a conflictual setting in which adversaries cannot contract on an enforcement variable (arms) and where the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. We show that, as the future becomes more important in this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261613
Individuals in social networks often imperfectly monitor others' network relationships and have incomplete information about the value of forming new relationships. This paper introduces the Generalized Conjectural Equilibrium (GCE) concept for such settings and completely characterizes the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005308028
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005331858
This paper studies mutual consent social networks in which individuals imperfectly monitor others' network ties and have incomplete information about the benefits of network participation. I introduce the Conjectural Pairwise Stability concept, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086843
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153325
We explore how peace or war can occur in the presence of commitment problems. These problems can be reduced by institutions of good governance or, alternatively, state capacity which (a) can be considered a collective good and (b) can be improved through investments. We show how the likelihood...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294399
In this paper, we explore two factors that can limit arming and, more generally, the costs of enforcement within and across states: governance or the formal organizations and institutions that help define and enforce property rights, and norms, or the informal arrangements in settling potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391818
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596112