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Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003727003

Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003704486

Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355541

Absolutely stable roommate problems

Mauleon, Ana; Molis, Elena; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; … - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009161528

Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems

Mauleon, Ana; Molis, Elena; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; … - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 4, pp. 925-943

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485862

von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082