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On research joint ventures and venture capital finance
Irngartinger, Markus - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001576102
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Contracting with researchers
Verbeck, Matthias; Schulte, Elisabeth - 2016
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on … effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive … this bias towards mainstream research always entails an efficiency loss if researchers are risk-averse. Our results suggest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450575
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A strategic R&D investment with flexible development time in real option game analysis
Villani, Giovanni - 2009
The real option theory provides a useful tool to evaluate an R&D investment under uncertainty because, unlike the NPV …. -- American Exchange options ; game theory ; Montecarlo simulation ; R&D ; information revelation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003872189
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Incentive mechanisms for delegating research
Taylor, Curtis Ray - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001356251
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Venture capital financing of innovation races : conference paper
Kovác, Eugen - 2014 - Preliminary and incomplete
This paper analyzes innovation races in a moral hazard setting. I develop a model where two competing entrepreneurs, financed by a single venture capitalist, work independently on the same project. The venture capitalist cannot observe the allocation of funds she provides, which creates a moral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481326
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An elementary model of VC financing and growth
Greenwood, Jeremy; Han, Pengfei; Inokuma, Hiroshi; … - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013447945
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Misperceptions, Moral Hazard, and Incentives in Groups
Gaynor, Martin - 2021
Recent work has shown that, in the presence of moral hazard, balanced budget Nash equilibria in groups are not pareto-optimal. This work shows that when agents misperceive the effects of their actions on the joint outcome, there exist a set of sharing rules which balance the budget and lead to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013248428
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Technology, team production and incentives
Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew - In: Economics letters 141 (2016), pp. 91-94
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616184
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Misperceptions, Moral Hazard, and Incentives in Groups
Gaynor, Martin - 1987
Recent work has shown that, in the presence of moral hazard, balanced budget Nash equilibria in groups are not pareto-optimal. This work shows that when agents misperceive the effects of their actions on the joint outcome, there exist a set of sharing rules which balance the budget and lead to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476839
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Profit sharing and incentives
Ozdenoren, Emre; Rubanov, Oleg - In: International journal of industrial organization 83 (2022), pp. 1-25
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411050