To analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a systemic bank run, we integrate the banking model `a la Diamond and Rajan (2001a) into a simplified version of an infinite-horizon neoclassical growth model. The banking sector intermediates the collateral-secured loans from households to...

In order to protect the public's confidence in deposit money, governments usually guarantee bank deposits implicitly or through an explicit deposit insurance system. Thus bank insolvency does not induce immediate bank runs. In many episodes of banking crises, several years passed quietly after...

This paper proposes a simple model that formalizes a variant of Ohanian's (2001) conjecture explaining the productivity declines observed in the Great Depression. If a large payment shock like an asset-price collapse renders many firms insolvent, other economic agents become exposed to a higher...

In this paper, we propose a theoretical model in which a banking crisis (or bank distress) causes declines in the aggregate productivity. When borrowing firms need additional bank loans to continue their businesses, a high probability of bank failure discourages ex ante investments (i.e.,...

We investigate a monetary model in which the centralized market opens once, but the decentralized markets open twice in each period. We show that there may be multiple stationary equilibria.

After the collapse of the asset price bubble, Japanese banks are said to have been reluctant to write off bad loans, even in cases where there is little prospect of borrower firms being able to repay the loans extended. This phenomenon is known as forbearance lending. We illustrate this using a...