Free trade often leads to resource depletion, such as deforestation in the tropics. This paper first presents a dynamic model whereby the South (S) depletes to export the extracted units (lumber) or the produce (beef) from land available after depletion. Because of the damages, the North...

Real-world negotiations differ fundamentally from existing bargaining theory. Inspired by the Paris Agreement on climate change, this paper develops a novel bargaining game in which each party quanti.es its own contribution (to a public good, for example), before the set of pledges must be...

Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a theory of this situation and shows when a small probability that some future government...

There are often conflicts between proponents of trade and environmental activists. This paper shows, however, how trade agreements can be designed so as to motivate environmental conservation. I first analyze a standard trade model, where resource exploitation (e.g., deforestation) is a...

Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...