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Excess demand functions when new assets are introduced

Momi, Takeshi - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 4, pp. 1832-1843

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003876982

Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents

Momi, Takeshi - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 3, pp. 1237-1254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763716

Failure of the index theorem in an incomplete market economy

Momi, Takeshi - In: Journal of mathematical economics 48 (2012) 6, pp. 437-444

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689433

Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences

Momi, Takeshi - In: Social choice and welfare 40 (2013) 3, pp. 787-792

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693419

The index theorem for a GEI economy when the degree of incompleteness is even

Momi, Takeshi - In: Journal of mathematical economics 39 (2003) 3/4, pp. 273-297

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001766839

Non-existence of equilibrium in an incomplete stock market economy

Momi, Takeshi - In: Journal of mathematical economics 35 (2001) 1, pp. 41-70

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001555493

Excess demand function around critical prices in incomplete markets

Momi, Takeshi - In: Journal of mathematical economics 46 (2010) 3, pp. 293-302

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009299726

Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies

Momi, Takeshi - In: Social choice and welfare 55 (2020) 2, pp. 325-367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012263385

Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

Momi, Takeshi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1267-1306

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753058

Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

Momi, Takeshi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1267-1306

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744271