Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we observe that the pre-post merger changes in CEO bonus are … significantly negatively related to the strength of corporate governance within the bidding bank. This suggests that bonus … corporate governance but are positively correlated with pre-post merger changes in the M/B ratio of the bidding banks, in line …

the effect of CEO aggressiveness on bank M&As. We construct a new measure of bank CEO aggressiveness based on CEOs … banks. Moreover, the impact of CEO aggressiveness on bank M&A decisions is more pronounced when the CEOs are from larger and … positive short-term stock market reactions to bank M&As initiated by aggressive CEOs …

This paper examines the mechanisms by which acquirer CEOs are incentivized and their impact on merger decisions. We … argue that the pre-merger structure of CEO wealth impacts a CEO's risk tolerance and ultimately her willingness to undertake … a merger as well as the framework of the deal. As the riskiness of CEO wealth increases (as measured by excess vega or …

when merger bonuses are present in deals where targets exhibit high pre-takeover abnormal accruals or are subject to SEC …Do merger bonuses to target CEOs facilitate a wealth transfer from target to acquirer shareholders? We test this … generate small synergies. When target CEOs get a merger bonus, acquirers pay lower premiums, but they also typically get less …

to redistribute merger proceeds to management. The current article highlights an overlooked distinction between pre-merger … golden parachutes and merger side-payments. Similar to a legislative rider attached to a popular bill, management can bundle …-it-or-leave-it merger vote. Because side-payments are bundled into a merger transaction, voting rights cannot adequately protect …

information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that … obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage. …

information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that … obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage. We derive conditions under …

This paper examines management's motives for rejecting takeover bids and the associated shareholder wealth effects. We …