This paper considers a simple moral hazard setting in which a project owner (or, more generally, a principal) hires a contractor (or, more generally, an agent) to operate her project. We show that a systematic increase in the agent's operating costs can increase either the principal's profit or...

We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents' individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents' contributions...

type="main" xml:id="jtsa12063-abs-0001" <title type="main">Abstract</title>Consider an infinite dimensional vector linear process. Under suitable assumptions on the parameter space, we provide consistent estimators of the autocovariance matrices. In particular, under causality, this includes the infinite-dimensional...

We study two specific symmetric random block Toeplitz (of dimension k×k) matrices, where the blocks (of size n×n) are (i) matrices with i.i.d. entries and (ii) asymmetric Toeplitz matrices. Under suitable assumptions on the entries, their limiting spectral distributions (LSDs) exist (after...

For estimators of parameters defined as minimisers of Q([theta])=Ef([theta],X), we study the asymptotic and generalised bootstrap properties. We concentrate on the case where Q does not have adequate smoothness for standard analysis to work. We describe the properties required by Q as well as...