This paper uses responder pre-commitment and the Jungian theory of mental activity and psychological type, as measured by the widely-used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three experiment design details are...

The majority of theoretical and experimental research stemming from Tullock’s (1980) model of rent-seeking considers static, single-period contests. This paper contributes to a growing body of research on multi-period rent-seeking contests by developing and experimentally testing a model in...

We examine voluntary contributions in a two-stage public good experiment with ‘carryover.’ In two treatments, each subject's second-stage endowment is determined by the return from the public good in the first-stage. We manipulate payoffs across treatments such that, relative to our...

We examine voluntary contributions in a two-stage public good experiment with ‘carryover.’ In two treatments, each subject’s second stage endowment is determined by the return from the public good in the first stage. We manipulate payoffs across these treatments so that, relative to our...

Conventional wisdom as well as economic theory suggests it is more costly to reassemble fragmented land due to transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs. Both costs are expected to increase with the number of sellers. Inefficient allocation of land resources may result including property...

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects' choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects' ability to determine the final...

Face-to-face communication is investigated as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism in experimental common-pool resource environments in which the appropriation activities of outside appropriators create coordination and monitoring problems for the communicating group. We identify three distinct...

We estimate the welfare consequences of local news broadcasting decisions in advertiser-funded television, a central question in media regulation. We model programming decisions as the outcome of a discrete game played by rival stations that compete for advertising revenue (which depends on...