The signaling model of Spence (1973) and the screening model of Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976) have been separately used to explain economic phenomena when there is asymmetric information. In the real world, however, situations of asymmetric information often simultaneously involve signaling and...

In this paper, we combine direct arbitrage arguments and an option-pricing approach to develop a method of pricing the option for rent control. For a lump-sum payment of "key money," a tenant acquires the right to rent a real estate unit for an exogenously determined controlled rent, as opposed...

We present a perfect Nash equilibrium in which the creator of a work, motivated by economic considerations, selectively enforces her own copyright. In fact, the creator may not only permit, but may strategically promote infringement of the copyright, thereby participating indirectly in predatory...

The correlation between immigrant objective and subjective characteristics and the likelihood of achieving homeownership is tested empirically. Also, the article examines whether homeownership promotes civic participation and community involvement among immigrants. Observing a sample of...

This research presents new findings on the economic cost of terror. To that end, we provide evidence of changes in house prices in the Gilo neighborhood of Jerusalem in the wake of the 2000 Second Palestinian Intifada. During that period, Gilo suffered from sporadic and ongoing gunfire from the...

This research employs data from a natural experiment to assess the effects of behavioral heuristics on housing choice and public program management. The analysis focuses on programs designed to privatize public housing in Israel. The government programs provided the tenants with a call (real)...

Screening equilibria, mainly those a la Rothchild-Stiglitz(1976), have been widely used to explain various aspects of mortgage contracting. In the real world, however, most mortghage contracting processes involve both signalling and screening. In this paper, we combine signalling and screening...