In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the "with whom") and the strategy ("the how") of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of...

Given the preferences of players and the rules governing network formation, what networks are likely to emerge and persist? And how do individuals and coalitions evaluate possible consequences of their actions in forming networks? To address these questions we introduce a model of network...

We introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. Rules may range from noncooperative, where players may only act unilaterally, to cooperative, where...

We model strategic competition between product differentiated oligopolists in a market with privately informed buyers as an abstract game over market situations. In this game each firm's strategy space consists of a set of catalogs--and each catalog in turn consists of a set of products and...