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Preference reversal has been frequent in tests with hypothetical, or small real, payoffs concerning lotteries as well as claims redeemable at different future dates. Preference reversal is tested here for the latter case with nontrivial payment levels and subjects likely to deal with decisions...
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The purpose of this paper is to describe a test involving five different approaches to estimating the demand for a public good. The test was conducted in a setting which permitted a real collective choice and in which each subject was committed to actual payments when relevant. The results...
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Preference reversal, or choice/reservation-price inconsistency, has been documented experimentally for certain types of lotteries. We argue that the relevance of these findings for real-world markets is uncertain because the type of objects used cannot exist on a market and because the extent to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011038727
The main purpose of this article is to advance a set of conditions which demand-revealing mechanisms must pass in order to be politically acceptable for real-world applications and - to begin with - for real-world experiments. Without such non-laboratory experiments, real progress seems unlikely...
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The robust laboratory evidence of preference reversal for lotteries has been interpreted as a threat to the general vailidity of standard theories of decision-making under uncertainty. This evidence is obtained from laboratory, that is, not real-world, lotteries with subjects who have not sought...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011038782
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is used in experimental economies as an incentive-compatible procedure for eliciting reservation prices. It is found here, where seller prices are elicited, that the mechanism is sensitive to the choice of upper bound of the randomly generated buyout prices....
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