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Specific Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways – An Experimental Analysis

Ehrmann, Thomas; Hartwig, Karl-Hans; Marner, Torsten; … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Westfälische … - 2009

, vertical separation, and a hybrid form. Economic theory predicts that vertical integration fosters socially optimal investment … predictions of model-theory, is surprising and can be attributed to the relatively high investments in the separated model. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008514716

Incentivising trust

Lenton, Pamela; Mosley, Paul - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 32 (2011) 5, pp. 890-897

We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577287

A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments

Schmutzler, Armin - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2006

Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756610

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games

Banerjee, Abhijit; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1996

This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. This set is finite and functionally independent of risk-dominance relations. As the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334873

(Un)bounded rationality in decision making and game theory : back to square one?

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 53-65

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented … modeling, as outlined here, is far from being a “global” theory with empirical content; rather it serves as a tool to formulate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751382

Institutions as game theory outcomes : towards a cognitive-experimental inquiry

Ambrosino, Angela - In: International journal of management, economics and … 2 (2013) 2, pp. 129-150

This paper investigates two different approaches to the analysis of institutions using game theory and discusses their … methodological and theoretical implications for further research. Starting from von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory, we investigate … method to investigate institutions as the unplanned outcome of self- interested individual behavior? While the game theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753456

The Nash equilibrium in the policy mix model for Czechia, Hungary, and Romania

Stawska, Joanna; Malaczewski, Maciej; Malaczewska, Paulina - In: Cogent economics & finance 9 (2021) 1, pp. 1-14

The aim of the paper is to compare the sensitivity of a government's fiscal policy and a central bank's monetary policy, which are in Nash equilibrium in the case of a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank in Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. The analysis for each country...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013183737

An experimental investigation of rating-market regulation

Keser, Claudia; Özgümüs, Asri; Peterlé, Emmanuel; … - 2017

We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit-rating agency. It involves up-front payments of issuer-fees and direct publication of requested ratings. Due to pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011579613

Identifying the ranking of focal points in coordination games on the individual level

Schmidt, Robert J. - 2019

We propose a method to identify the ranking of focal points (Schelling, 1960) on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects bet on only one alternative, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows them to invest in multiple alternatives and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011987024

The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lison: A game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU

Lechner, Susanne; Ohr, Renate - 2008

The ways of decision making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: the rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300191