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Auditor and audit independence in an age of financial scandals

Cooper, David J.; Neu, Dean - In: Independent accounts : the possibilities for auditor …, (pp. 1-15). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003458092

Understanding overbidding in second price auctions : an experimental study

Cooper, David J. (contributor); Fang, Hanming (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003468447

Communication, renegotiation, and the scope for collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003911901

Learning and transfer in signaling games

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 34 (2008) 3, pp. 415-439

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003607010

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 10 (2007) 3, pp. 269-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003608174

It's what you say, not what you pay : an experimental study of manager-employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J. - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 5 (2007) 6, pp. 1223-1268

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578545

Critical theorising in management accounting research

Cooper, David J.; Hopper, Trevor - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578633

Symposium on behavioral game theory

Cooper, David J. (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003510767

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations : an experimental study

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J. - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 9 (2006) 4, pp. 407-423

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003396079

Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams : forward induction or faster adaptive learning?

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 63 (2009) 4, pp. 216-224

Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho–Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943316