We experimentally compare the incentive effects of rewarding individuals for outstanding performance publicly versus privately. We implement two real-effort tasks, which differ in how prestigious subjects perceive working on them. In both tasks private and public feedback similarly enhances...

Various empirical papers have shown that peers affect productivity and behavior in the workplace. However, the mechanisms through which peers influence each other are still largely unknown. In this laboratory experiment we study a situation in which individuals might look at their peers'...

We address the question of whether hedge fund and private equity investments in public firms are motivated by corporate governance improvements. As opposed to traditional financial investors both HF and PE are likely to have the incentives to alleviate agency conflicts. However, against the...

We study how stock price informativeness changes with the presence of highfrequency trading (HFT). Our estimate is based on the staggered start of HFT participation in a panel of international exchanges. With HFT presence market prices are a less reliable predictor of future cash ows and...

This paper addresses the question of how the timing of corporate insider trading is related to the level of information asymmetry in a stock price. Our empirical analysis shows that, when buying their firm's shares, corporate insiders are likely to exploit their informational advantage through...

This study documents economically meaningful and persistent financial advisor fixed effects in target firms' abnormal stock returns shortly prior to takeover announcements.Additional difference-in-differences analyses suggest that advisors are associated with lower pre-bid stock returns after...

The paper explores the consequences of SEC detection of illegal insider trading on subsequent insider trading activities. We hypothesize that individuals with private information update their subjective probabilities of getting caught and are less likely to exploit material, non-public...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...