When markets are incomplete, the competitive equilibria considered so far are not constrained Pareto-efficient, production efficiency breaks down and shareholders no longer agree on the objective function of the firm. We first show by way of an example that these inefficiencies originate in the...

The paper introduces an abstract economy with imperfect competition; the choice of allocation takes place through an abstract mechanism, when produceres choose strategies and the outcome is (a set of) feasible allocations, where the consumers' choices are sustained by the market mechanism at...

A basic worldview of economic theory is the notion that humans have unlimited material wants and limited means to satisfy these wants. In this framework the task of economists is to design policy instruments to meet human preferences for material commodities as efficiently as possible, that is,...

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization's stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by...

It has been claimed that the market fosters selfishness and thereby undermines the moral basis of society. This thesis has been developed with an emphasis on market exchange. Everyday life is, however, predominantly shaped by interactions in the workplace rather than by shopping behaviour. This...

В статье рассматриваются традиционные и современные теории фирмы, проводится их сравнительный анализ. Формулируются основные положения современной теории...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the implications of different degrees of relationship-specificity when there are two parties, A and B, who can make investments in physical capital (instead of human capital). If...