In subjective expected utility (SEU) the decision weights people attach to events are their beliefs about the likelihood of events. Much empirical evidence, inspired by Ellsberg (1961) and others, shows that people prefer to bet on events they know more about, even when their beliefs are held...

The "disposition effect" is the tendency to sell assets that have gained value ("winners") and keep assets that have lost value ("losers"). Disposition effects can be explained by two elements of prospect theory: The idea that people value gains and losses relative to the initial purchase price...

The workhorses of economic analysis are simple formal models that can explain naturally occurring phenomena. Reflecting this taste, economists often say they will incorporate more psychological ideas into economics if those ideas can parsimoniously account for field data better than standard...

Noncooperative game-theoretic models of sequential bargaining give an underpinning to cooperative solution concepts derived from axioms, and have proved useful in applications (see Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). But experimental studies of sequential bargaining with discounting have generally...

Classic literature on organizations recognizes that the paramount function of an organization is the coordination of physical and human assets to produce a good or service (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Chisholm, 1989; Schein, 1985). Coordination in this early literature was defined broadly, as for example by...

The possibility that asset markets could be strategically manipulated by large informed traders has fascinated social scientists and market observers for years. There is a well-known story of minions of Nathan Rothschild, who was thought to have the fastest carrier pigeons in London, selling...

In the last ten years theory (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) and empirical data fitting have provided many ideas about how equilibria arise in games or markets. This short chapter describes a very general approach to learning in games: "experience-weighted attraction" (EWA) learning. This...

In earlier research we proposed an “experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning” model for predicting dynamic behavior in economic experiments on multiperson noncooperative normal-form games. We showed that EWA learning model fits significantly better than existing learning models (choice...

The canonical model in economics considers people to be rational and self-regarding. However, much evidence challenges this view, raising the question of when “Economic Man” dominates the outcome of social interactions, and when bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences dominate....