In this paper, I study dynamic and sequential fair division problems for players with dichotomous preferences. I have devised a systematic approach of designing efficient, envy-free, and strategy-proof mechanisms for generic problems. The mechanisms developed in this paper can accommodate common...

This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...

We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains...

A random assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for any of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that...