This paper uses a transaction cost approach in order to classify the different policy options that are currently discussed in relation to the Kyoto protocol. It analyses the market as only one of the possible collective decision making processes, which are available to operationalize the concept...

Future emissions of trace gases are intrinsically linked to economic growth and abatement policies, which in turn, are governed by expectations of greenhouse damages. Trace gas indices that depend upon future emissions can be calculated either on the basis of emissions scenarios, such as those...

This report summarises the main ideas, proposals, scientific achievements, consensus and conflicting issues that emerged at the Second EFIEA Policy Workshop, held at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Palazzo delle Stelline, Corso Magenta 63, Milan, Italy, March 4th-6th, 1999. EFIEA, the European...

The Kyoto Protocol sets legally binding emission targets for industrialised countries without accounting for reductions carried out prior to 2008, the beginning of the first commitment period. There exists only one exception, the project-based Clean Development Mechanism where credits accrue...

With the liberalisation of the European electricity market, new instruments are searched for in order to co-ordinate climate change initiatives with competition. This paper analyses the potential of a system of green electricity certificates to regulate the introduction of renewable energy...

This paper surveys the recent literature devoted to the analysis of the interactions between the adoption of voluntary or negotiated agreements as a tool of environmental policy and market structure. The goal of this survey is twofold. On the one hand, we would like to identify the market...

Respondents of contingent valuation surveys may place a null value on the public good, for reasons that differ from a genuine indifference to the good, but that can be interpreted as a "protest": either against the interview, or the public management, or both. A good survey design can...

We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term...

This paper investigates the structure of bilateral oligopolies - a simple version of Shapley Shubik games with two types of traders and two commodities. It shows that interior equilibria exist, studies the example of CES utility functions to uncover the relation between the complementarity of...