Similar Search Results

Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior : an experiment

Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526

Analogy-based expectations and the partially cursed equilibrium

Miettinen, Topi - 2008

Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281209

Erwartungsbildung, individuelle Entscheidungen und das Lernen ökonomischer Zusammenhänge

Heinemann, Maik - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001546527

Learning, heterogeneity, and complexity in the New Keynesian model

Calvert Jump, Robert; Hommes, Cars H.; Levine, Paul - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 166 (2019), pp. 446-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149103

Behavioral and experimental macroeconomics and policy analysis : a complex systems approach

Hommes, Cars H. - In: Journal of economic literature 59 (2021) 1, pp. 149-219

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542608

Learning with unobserved regimes

Cone, Thomas E. - In: Journal of macroeconomics 73 (2022), pp. 1-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013443877

Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks

Acemoglu, Daron; Ozdaglar, Asuman E. - 2010

and non-Bayesian models of social learning and focus on the implications of the form of learning (e.g., Bayesian vs. non … individuals are situated on three key questions: (1) whether social learning will lead to consensus, i.e., to agreement among … individuals starting with different views; (2) whether social learning will effectively aggregate dispersed information and thus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190896

Overconfidence and managers' responsibility hoarding

Nieken, Petra; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Zhou, Nannan - 2011

Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571367

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723

Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014

We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721