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Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030

Modeling a satisficing judge

Engel, Christoph; Güth, Werner - 2015

Judges and juries frequently must decide, knowing that they do not know everything that would be relevant for deciding the case. The law uses two related institutions for enabling courts to nonetheless decide the case: the standard of proof, and the burden of proof. In this paper, we contrast a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349372

Learning foundation for the cursed equilibrium

Miettinen, Topi - 2008

Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This … equilibrium. -- Analogy expectations ; bounded rationality ; curse ; learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003803107

Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio - 2016

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players' behavior deviates from rationality. Instead we assume that there exists a probability p such that all players play rationally with at least probability p, and all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001091

Modeling a Satisficing Judge

Engel, Christoph - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014221

Why Lying Pays : Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - 2005

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms "truth bias" reported in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066107

From self-fulfilling mistakes to behavioral learning equilibria

Hommes, Cars H. - 2017

This essay links some of my own work on expectations, learning and bounded rationality to the inspiring ideas of Jean …-Michel Grandmont. In particular, my work on consistent expectations and behavioral learning equilibria may be seen as formalizations of … JMG's ideas of self-fulfilling mistakes. Some of our learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments with human subjects have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590425

Paying Attention to Payoffs in Analogy-Based Learning

Miettinen, Topi - 2009

This paper introduces the payoff-confirming analogy-based expectation equilibrium (PCABEE) as a way to refine the set of analogy-based equilibria and the associated admissible analogy partitions. In addition to the actions of others, own payoff history provides information about others'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110634

Learning foundation for the cursed equilibrium

Miettinen, Topi - 2008

Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266678

Learning Foundations and Complexity of the Cursed Equilibrium

Miettinen, Topi - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2007

Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765162