Using a unique sample of comparable online and in-person loan transactions, we study the determinants of arm's-length and inside lending focusing on the differential information content across debt types. We find that soft private information primarily underlies relationship lending whereas hard...

Using a unique sample of comparable online and in-person loan transactions, we study the determinants of arm's-length and inside lending focusing on the differential information content across debt types. We find that soft private information primarily underlies relationship lending whereas hard...

The inability to reconcile observed levels of foreign exchange rate volatility with predictions derived from rational expectations models represents one of the most persistent challenges in international finance. This paper shows that such excess volatility puzzles arise from informational...

Corporate disclosure policies, by promoting greater transparency, foster external scrutiny and thus activity in the market for corporate control. A firm's relative reliance on takeovers versus internal board monitoring is therefore itself an aspect of its governance arrangements. However, agency...

This paper explores a firm's reliance on internal and external governance mechanisms, recognizing that the choice of one instrument relative to the other is itself part of the governance policy of the firm. Starting from the premise that firms' disclosure policies can foster external scrutiny...

We investigate the interaction between banks' use of information acquisition as a strategic tool and their role in promoting the efficiency of credit markets when a bank's ability to gather information varies with its distance to the borrower. We show that banks acquire proprietary information...

Joint ventures afford unique opportunities to study how firms assert property rights over jointly used assets because parents clearly delineate control. We argue that ownership allocations trade off investment incentives with control-related inefficiencies. We show how residual control rights...