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A strike insurance is integrated into a model based on one-sided private information of the firm. It is shown that the strike insurance will increase the dispute level if payments to the insurance are lump-sum or if payments from the insurance are proportional to wages. However, if wages affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008615537
", on the future prices. At a sequential equilibrium, all agents expect the "true" price as a possible outcome, and elect … markets at equilibrium, or preclude any perfect price foresight. The second paper shows that correct anticipations need always …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622003
In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state (s) which would grant the agent an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622013
sequential equilibrium, all agents expect the "true" price as a possible outcome, and elect optimal strategies, which clear on … equilibrium with perfect price foresight. We display on an example a continuum of sequential equilibria, varying with agents …' anticipations. We show, when anticipations are private or prone to change, that "correct" price forecasts need always embed a set of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622015
The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008566393
In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the information of others from their choices. To understand this thinking process further, we use "Mousetracking" to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, in games of private information with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008567802
; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568535
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer — the seller — follows from a non–trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer–induced certification acts as an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568612
Settlements are often considered to be welfare-enhancing because they save time and litigation costs. In the presence of court error, however, this conclusion may be wrong. Court decisions create positive externalities for future litigants which will not occur if a dispute is settled out of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008570650
Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572569