This paper provides evidence of deliberate private-information disclosure within banks' international business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover buy more stocks of the target ffrm prior to the deal announcement,...

Basel III proposes market discipline (banking disclosure requirements) as a key instrument to achieve soundness in the banking system. Consequently, it is necessary to test the presence of responses to bank risk on the part of the economic agents. This article empirically studies the mechanisms...

Can consolidation policy be made consistent with macro-prudential supervision? In this study, we seek to provide new insights on this key-question using a network approach. We study how the resilience of a banking network evolves as we shock an initially homogenous competitive market with a...

This paper examines what institutional and bank-specific factors determine bank stock price synchronicity. Using data on 37 countries from 1996–2007, we find that bank stocks are more aligned with the whole market during the financial crisis; in countries that have more credit provided by...

We investigate asset returns around banking crises in 44 advanced and emerging economies from 1960 to 2016. In contrast to the view that buying assets during banking crises is a profitable long-run strategy, we find that returns of equity and other asset classes often underperform following...

We examine which traditional asset pricing variables together with bank-specific accounting variables explain the cross-sectional variation of future bank stock returns, using a firm-level data of eight Asian countries. Our empirical evidence shows that exchange rate risk, firm size, the...

This paper examines what institutional and bank-specific factors determine bank stock price synchronicity. Using data on 37 countries from 1996-2007, we find that bank stocks are more aligned with the whole market (1) during the financial crisis; (2) in countries that have more credit provided...

Banks hold liquid and illiquid assets. An illiquid bank that receives a liquidity shock sells assets to liquid banks in exchange for cash. We characterize the constrained efficient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem and show that the market equilibrium is constrained inefficient,...

We present a model of banks' liquidity management where banks choose a portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets, and later on decide to lend or hoard liquidity. Ex ante, banks choose whether to be "liquid", by holding both liquid and illiquid assets, or "illiquid", by holding only illiquid...

Banks hold liquid and illiquid assets. An illiquid bank that receives a liquidity shock sells assets to liquid banks in exchange for cash. We characterize the constrained efficient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem and show that the market equilibrium is constrained inefficient,...