This paper examines how quality incentives are related to the interoperability of competing platforms. Platforms choose whether to operate standardised or exclusively, prior to quality and subsequent price competition. We find that platforms choose a common standard if they can coordinate their...

We analyze competition between two platforms with positive network externalities. Platforms can choose to interconnect or alternatively, operate exclusively. We examine how this decision will affect pricing behaviour and incentives to invest in Platform quality. We find that interconnection is...

Negotiations regularly take place on the business-to-business side of two-sided markets. However, little is known about the consequences of these negotiations on a platform's design, pricing, participation, and welfare. In this paper, we propose a model where platforms choose between the...

This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, the advertisers, exerts a negative externality on the ther side, the users. It is shown that if platforms can charge advertisers only, a higher degree of competition for users can lead to higher...

The presence of multiple sellers in the provision of (non-substitutable) complementary goods leads to outcomes that are worse than those generated by an integrated monopoly, a problem also known as "tragedy of the anticommons". In this paper we identify some conditions under which the tragedy is...

Digital platforms operate in multisided markets providing services through the internet to two or more distinct groups of users, between which there are indirect network effects. Direct network effects are frequently present within each group. Therefore, online platforms usually present both...

Market power on each side of a multisided platform, whether in the form of increasing prices or decreasing quality, is constrained by the risk of losing sales on the other sides. That tends to weaken market power on each side and encourages platforms to keep prices lower and quality higher than...

We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product differentiation on each side of the market. When platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers, we show that competitive bottlenecks arise endogenously. In equilibrium,...