We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide-scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions-operational problems and changes in participants' behavior. We model the interbank payment system as an n-player game and utilize the concept of a potential...

We track 38,000 money market trades from execution to delivery and return to provide a first empirical analysis of settlement delays in financial markets. In line with predictions from recent models showing that financial claims are settled strategically, we document a tendency by lenders to...

The present paper proposes new concepts and a new scenario with which to analyze cooperative interim contracting and re-contracting in an organization.

The issue of the connection between correlated equilibria of Maskin-Tirole (1987) economies and finite markovian stationary sunspot equilibria of overlapping generations economies is reconsidered in this paper.

Each solution concept on a class of normal form games with a given outcome space can be regarded as a social choice correspondence. Here we present a general method of constructing compound solution concepts out of given ones by means of games of pretension.

In this paper we extend an egalitarian solution for two-person games to n-person cooperative games so that the estalished standard is observed for every two agents of the game.