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TESTING GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF FREE RIDING: NEW EVIDENCE OD PROBABILITY BIAS AND LEARNING.

PALFREY, T.R.; ROSENTHAL, H. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574255

Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games.

Fudenberg, D. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574258

Folk Theorems : Two-Dimensionality is (Almost) Enough.

Smith, L. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574291

Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players.

Fudenberg, D.; Levine, D.K. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574324

The incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions: a game theoretic approach using the WITCH Model

Carraro, Carlo; Bosetti, Valentina; Cian, Enrica De; … - Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia - 2009

2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556591

Social Networks

De Martí, Joan; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557014

Economics of intolerance and social conflict

Gangopadhyay, Partha - In: Economics of Peace and Security Journal 4 (2009) 2, pp. 23-31

An important consensus today is that intolerance and social conflict have a substantial economic dimension. This article models a person’s “returns” to acts of intolerance in terms of social approval or disapproval that this person’s peer-group may offer. It is found that high levels of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557204

Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers.

Baliga, S.; Evans, R. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1996

We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113831

Determination of the effect of product substitutability on sales performance of integrated and decentralised supply chains through Nash equilibria

Wang, Renwen; Zhao, Shuliang; Song, Wei; Cacciolatti, Luca - In: International Journal of Productivity and Performance … 63 (2014) 7, pp. 863-878

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of product substitutability on sales performance of integrated and decentralised supply chains. The authors model supply chain performance effects by applying a Cournot equation to a combination of different industry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014798370

Comparison between two scale‐inspection and warranty policies for weight‐quality

Sandoh, Hiroaki; Koide, Takeshi - In: International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management 22 (2005) 7, pp. 731-748

Purpose – To make a theoretical comparison between two scale‐inspection and warranty policies for weight‐quality, one practical and the other theoretically grounded. Design/methodology/approach – Comparison is made in a Stackelberg game framework considering the consumer's as well as the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014800327