Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 6,012
Cover Image
Coalition structural games and the voluntary provision of public goods
Aşan, Göksel; Sanver, M. Remzi - In: Advances in economic design : with 28 tables, (pp. 251-259). 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871856
Cover Image
Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games
Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942524
Cover Image
Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model
Fraser, Clive D. - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545889
Cover Image
Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - In: Games and economic behavior 70 (2010) 1, pp. 12-20
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009242488
Cover Image
Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model
Fraser, Clive D. - In: Economics letters 117 (2012) 2, pp. 496-499
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009675150
Cover Image
Voting for voters : a model of electoral evolution
Barberà, Salvador; Mashler, Mikhaʾel; Shalev, Jonathan - In: Games and economic behavior 37 (2001) 1, pp. 40-78
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001619163
Cover Image
Voting for voters : the unanimity case
Granot, Daniel; Mashler, Mikhaʾel; Shalev, Jonathan - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 31 (2002) 2, pp. 155-202
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001729307
Cover Image
Thematic clubs and the supremacy of network externalities
Amir, Rabah; Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold; Resende, Joana - In: Journal of public economic theory 16 (2014) 5, pp. 706-729
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442935
Cover Image
On the formation of clubs
Arnold, Tone - In: The political economy of institutional evolution, (pp. 137-152). 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014554889
Cover Image
Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games
Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - 2009
We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202604