We study the stability of trade policy arrangements under two regulatory scenarios, with/without PTAs. Unlike previous papers, we consider an extensive set of trade policy constellations and allow for unlimited farsightedness of negotiating parties. We find global free trade (GFT) to be uniquely...

We study the stability of trade policy arrangements under two regulatory scenarios, with/without PTAs. Unlike previous papers, we consider an extensive set of trade policy constellations and allow for unlimited farsightedness of negotiating parties. We find global free trade (GFT) to be uniquely...

This article examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of Chinese and Indian exports in world markets. To explain more protection in sectors where a large share of imports originates in China and India, the “protection for sale” model is extended to...

I present a study of ownership of firms under government rent seeking. Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an investment. Such a government rent seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem. Government ownership is shown...

I put forward a new theoretical framework to analyze the relationship between soft budget constraint syndrome and the economic performances of firms. It differs from the existing theoretical framework, à la Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), in the soft budget constraint literature. In this paper,...

I present a study of ownership of firms under government rent seeking. Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an investment. Such a government rent seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem. Government ownership is shown...

I present a study of ownership of firms under government rent seeking. Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an investment. Such a government rent seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem. Government ownership is shown...