This paper studies a model of firms with endogenous bilateral exposures and government bailouts. It is shown that the anticipation of bailouts makes firms less concerned with the counterparty choices of their counterparties. This “network hazard” gives rise to large central firms. Bailouts...

Banks and other financial institutions which were too-big-to-fail (TBTF) played a central role during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. The present article lays out how misguided policies enabled banks to grow both in size as well as in complexity and therefore acquire TBTF status,...

We examine the moral hazard effects of bank recapitalizations by assessing the impact of the U.S. TARP program on market discipline exerted by subordinated debt-holders using a sample of 123 bank holding companies over the period 2004-2013. Predicted distress risk has a consistently positive and...

A recent line of research deals with the formulation, the justification and the modelling of a crisis triggered by involved economic agents. Modelling financial crises within an asymmetric information environment is argued to be a difficult task since the measurement of adverse selection and/or...

During the global financial crisis, a large number of banks worldwide either failed or received financial aid thus inflicting substantial losses on the system. We contribute to the early warning literature by constructing a dynamic competing risks hazard model that explores the joint...

In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The...

Financial sector innovation and development since the 1970s contributed to global prosperity, but increased the probability of bank failures. The post-2007 financial crisis was one of many crises with idiosyncratic catalysts but common underlying causes. Public policies, such as deposit...

The concentration of risk within financial system is considered to be a source of systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions. We build a model of portfolio choice and...

A growing literature exploits credit score cutoff rules used by mortgage lenders as a natural experiment to estimate the moral hazard effect of securitization on underwriting. This research design is premised on the assumption that these cutoff rules are a response by lenders to securitization...

We analyze the impact of the announcement of the banking union on stock market returns of euro area banks against the backdrop of three commonly held views of the banking union. We document positive individual abnormal returns for most banks. Abnormal returns are large and positive on average,...