It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that...

In this Article, I set forth a theory (“concentrated enforcement”) for allocating scarce enforcement resources within a low compliance tax sector. The intuition behind concentrated enforcement is that, under a number of different circumstances, there may be increasing marginal returns to...

This paper analyzes the effects on tax compliance of monitoring the information trails generated by firms' activities. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than 6 million euros in reported revenue. Firms...

The United States Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has repeatedly taken the position that, because the IRS does not ask taxpayers to identify their race or ethnicity on submitted tax returns, IRS enforcement actions are not affected by taxpayers' race or ethnicity. This claim, which I call...

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that...

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) war on offshore tax evasion. The authors explain the new emerging regulatory regimes on the global exchange of information to combat offshore tax evasion and analyse why Automatic...